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most of the author's views will be corroborated by candid observers. There can be no question that the Englishman, at this writing, manages his courts with less delay and quibbling than the American, with less declamation than the Frenchman and with more flexibility than the German.

This was not always true and may not be lasting. The danger of the English bar lies in its isolation. The rigid etiquette which keeps the client at a distance, the cloistered life and caste attitude will be difficult to reconcile with the growing socialism of Great Britain. The local solicitor in his closer relations with the proletariat is in a position to take advantage of every opportunity to encroach upon the privileges of the bar. In spite of our common traditions, conditions in America are too different to afford a reasonable basis for contrast with the English system. The tendency of Constitution Law to crowd private law into the background, the narrowness of the half educated early nineteenth century lawyer, the lack for many years of a National Bar Association and the weakness of local societies have all contribute to prevent the expression of bar sentiment and to delay the enactment of scientific legislation. These things are on the mend, and we may have as good reason to be pleased with our progress in the twentieth century as England has to be proud of the improvement of her jurisprudence in the nineteenth.

W. H. L.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS. By G. Glover Alexander. Cambridge University Press, 1911.

The author has attempted the difficult task of condensing into 140 small pages a readable summary of criminal procedure in England and Wales. The booklet forms one of the series of Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature; and should meet the intention of its publishers to supply to the average Englishman untrained in the law, an explanation of the rudiments of the criminal procedure of his country. The American reader, whose eyes are commencing to be opened to the unsatisfactory state of our own procedure, will be enlightened as to some of our existing differences.

The average reader should acquire an intelligent impression of the fundamental machinery of English criminal law. Unfortunately there are a few dark spots which must be lightened by the readers own knowledge of English institutions. The necessity of brevity is no doubt the cause of these lapses, which occur, for the most part, in the portion devoted to the Justices of the Peace. It must be admitted that to explain this functionary, the product of piece-meal legislation extending over more than five centuries, is no easy task.

More than one-half of the booklet is devoted to magistrates and magistrates' courts. This seems justifiable in a popular treatise, when the importance of this office is considered, as an initiator of criminal procedure and the "judge" most closely in contact with the people.

At a time when the administration of justice by magistrates in this country is under a particularly warm fire of adverse criticism by students of sociology, a simple explanation of the English system of summary jurisdiction is welcome. This jurisdiction, the creation of statutes dating from 1848 and exercised by the Justices of the Peace in what is called the Petty Sessional Court, extends to a large number of small indictable offences enumerated in the appendix. The jurisdiction depends upon the consent of the accused or if under fourteen, of the accused's parent. Worthy of notice, also, is the Justices' clerk who makes this police court, a court of record and applies to difficult questions presented to the lay Justices the legally trained mind of a barrister or solicitor of standing.

The remainder of the text is devoted to the shortest possible outline of the jurisdiction and procedure obtaining in the major criminal courts, in the order of their authority: Assizes, High Court of the King's Bench Division,

the Court of Criminal Appeal, created in 1908, and the House of Lords, the first two, however, of co-ordinate jurisdiction.

At the end of the book are several appendices, the space occupied by which might have been more profitably given to a fuller treatment of the difficult subject of the Justices of the Peace. There is both a topical index and an analysis of contents which helps to classify and correlate the subject matter in the reader's mind.

L. R.

A CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY OF WORDS, PHRASES AND MAXIMS. By Frederick Jesup Stimson, Professor of Comparative Legislation in Harvard University. Revised Edition by Harvey Cortlandt Voorhees, of the Boston Bar. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1911. Pages, 344 and Appendix.

In the prefatory note, the editor of the revision of the work of Professor Stimson states that his labor has been to supplement rather than to revise. This supplementary work, he states, has consisted principally in the addition of important words, and the insertion of many citations and references "designed to lead the researcher to a fuller understanding of the meaning and practical use of the words defined and explained." It has been stated also that in giving these references, the needs of law students have been held paramount, and the books and reports cited have been those most accessible to students.

The size of the book also seems to have been determined with a view to suiting the needs of the student. The volume is one easily carried from place to place, so that it may be used both in and out of the law school without any inconvenience incident to transporting it.

Although the size and scope of the volume make impossible that completeness of vocabulary and fulness of definition found in the larger law dictionaries, the conciseness of the work does not detract from its merit. The vocabulary is by no means small, and the definitions, although brief, are sufficient to enlighten the student. Those desirous of acquiring further information than there given may avail themselves of the references given to other works.

The result of the methods employed by both the author and the revising editor is a volume, compact in size and concise in subject-matter, very well adapted for the use of those whose needs it is designed to meet.

J. T. C.

GILMORE ON PARTNERSHIP, (Hornbook Series). By Eugene Allen Gilmore. West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn. 1911, pp. XII, 721.

The author of the present volume, hemmed about and restricted as he was by the system of the publication, is to be congratulated upon the good points of the book rather than to be condemned for the defects thereof. In so far as the author makes concrete statements of the law, he is generally correct; but where the statement is a broad general one, it is at times misleading or incorrect. The defects here noted are particularly prevalent in the forepart of the treatise, though not confined to that portion. Thus it is submitted that objections may well be raised as to many of the black-letter parts of the first chapter. The author, himself, in chapter three, appears to dissent from the definition of partnership adopted in chapter one. The discussion of partnership property is an advance upon what has heretofore been presented and is believed to be correct. One must, however, clearly perceive the meaning of "intention." It is believed that the right of dower is susceptible of a clearer declaration than is here given. The declaration that the transfer of partnership property to pay an individual indebtedness of a partner is a voluntary one is, at least, not accurate, for generally the individual partner gives up some of his rights against the firm, namely the